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Response to Beth Richie’s ―Black Feminism, Gender
Violence and the Build-up of a Prison Nation‖
Kimberly D. Bailey
I would like to thank Professor Richie for such a provocative and
inspirational address. With respect to the violence against women
movement, Professor Richie has always been a voice for those
women who generally do not have a voice, specifically poor women,
women of color, and immigrant women. Her insight today that the
mainstream feminist theorization of domestic violence continues to
leave them voiceless is a particularly important one.
I would like to continue her conversation by focusing on the
concept of privacy. I use this term in the same sense that liberal
theorists use it, as a representation of a sphere that is inappropriate
for government intrusion.1 As other scholars have noted, this concept
has been somewhat complicated in the context of women’s rights.2
On the one hand, the concept of decisional privacy—or what some
prefer to call liberty—is the foundation for such rights as
contraceptive use and abortion.3 On the other hand, privacy
historically was also used to justify inaction on the part of the police,
judges, and prosecutors in response to women who would seek
intervention from the criminal justice system in order to stop the
violence that they were experiencing in their homes.4 In other words,
the privacy of the patriarchal head of the household to run his home
as he saw fit was valued over the bodily integrity of the wife.

Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A. (1995), Indiana
University; J.D. (2000), The University of Michigan Law School.
1. See ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 33–34 (1983).
2. See KRISTEN S. RAMBO, ―TRIVIAL COMPLAINTS‖: THE ROLE OF PRIVACY IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW AND ACTIVISM IN THE U.S. 4 (2009); JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN
THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 5–6
(2009).
3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
514 (1965).
4. See RAMBO, supra note 2, at 22–23.
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Arguing that ―the personal is political,‖ feminists in the 1960s and
1970s rejected the notion that violence in the home was a private
matter.5 Instead, they argued that the reason women could be victims
in their own homes was because of the political subordination of
women as a class in society.6 Furthermore, by not intervening when
women experienced violence in the home, the state was actually
complicit in this violence and subordination.7 Therefore, for many
feminists the notion of a dichotomy between a public sphere where
government regulation was appropriate and a private sphere where it
was not was a false one because these spheres are actually
interrelated.8 Other feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon argued
that the private sphere needed to be completely destroyed because the
notion of privacy was really something that applied to men to the
detriment of women.9
The problem with destroying the private, however, is that the
more governmental intrusion that occurs in one’s life, the less
decisional privacy one has. This often leads to serious negative
consequences. This particularly has been the story of poor women
and women of color who historically have had very little privacy, and
this phenomenon can be illustrated by what happened in the battered
women’s movement. By arguing that violence against women in the
home was actually a public issue, feminists justified the need for
intervention from the criminal justice system.10 But they encountered
police officers, prosecutors, and judges who still viewed violence in
the home as a private matter and refused to enforce the law against
batterers.11 In response, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies
were created and police and prosecutors were strongly encouraged or
5. Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal is
Political,” and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255, 1260
(2010) (quoting Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR:
WOMEN’S LIBERATION: MAJOR WRITINGS FROM RADICAL FEMINISTS 76 (SHULAMITH
FIRESTONE ed., 1970)).
6. Id. at 1261.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 1262–63.
9. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191
(1989).
10. See Bailey, supra note 5, at 1265.
11. See id. at 1270.
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required to arrest and to prosecute if there was probable cause of
domestic abuse.12 Now, I do not believe that these policies were
instituted because of mainstream feminist theorization on privacy.
Instead, I believe that they were implemented because they fit in with
the conservatization of the criminal justice system that was already
occurring in the 1980’s and 1990’s that created a heavy focus on
arrest and prosecution. Nevertheless, many feminists still justify these
policies based on this idea that domestic violence is a public issue.13
I do not want to minimize the importance of improving the
institutional response of the criminal justice system to domestic
violence. But when the concept of privacy is completely ignored, one
finds greater governmental intrusion, less decisional privacy, and
serious consequences. This is exactly what has occurred under
mandatory policies. The reality is that poor women and women of
color are already more likely to be on the radar of the criminal justice
system because they often live in cramped conditions with thinner
walls that make it impossible to hide what is going on inside or
because they are receiving government benefits that subject them to
greater state scrutiny. As a result, these women are more apt to
experience these negative consequences. First, when women have no
voice in whether their batterer is arrested or prosecuted, they risk
serious economic consequences. It is estimated that when a woman
leaves her batterer, there is a fifty percent risk that she will live below
the poverty level.14 A significant number of those in the homeless
population are domestic violence victims and their children.15 In
addition, it is not clear that arresting abusers makes the victims safer;
there is some research that suggests that it may make the abuse worse
for some victims.16 And currently, there is a horrible phenomenon
happening where once the criminal justice system becomes aware of
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 1268–71.
See id. at 1271.
Id. at 1281.
See id. at 1281–82.
See id. at 1292–93.
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abuse in the home, the victim can be punished for neglect and may
have her children taken away.17
As a result, more theorization is needed to explain why women
are entitled both to state intervention, should they want its assistance
to stop the violence in their lives, and some decisional privacy in
deciding how best to extricate themselves from a violent relationship.
Some feminists have argued for an affirmative right of privacy in the
domestic violence context that justifies state intervention on the basis
of a victim’s affirmative right to bodily integrity.18 But I am making a
normative plea for an affirmative right to choose how to deal with the
violence in one’s life, including limiting the involvement of the
criminal justice system.19 In order to ensure women’s safety,
however, limiting the intrusiveness of the criminal justice system
means that we are going to have to come up with creative grassroots
alternatives reminiscent of the early battered women’s movement,
which focused on providing shelter and material support to victims.
In addition, to the extent that these alternatives are based on state
funding, we need to make sure that these methods do not result in the
same level of intrusiveness that occurs when individuals seek state
help.
17. See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth
of the Passive Battered Mother and the “Protected Child” in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58
ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1088–90 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF
PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 53 (Martha Alberston Fineman &
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
19. I plan to explore this affirmative right to privacy in future articles.

